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Abstract
Individuals with depression are prone to engaging in rumina-
tion, a process in which attention turns inwards to narrowly-
focused, negative patterns of thought, at the cost of attend-
ing to a task. Other core deficits associated with depression
are weaker inhibition of information that is no longer relevant,
and a negative perceptual bias. Here, we present a computa-
tional cognitive model that uses these mechanisms to explain
performance on an n-back task in which the stimuli are faces
with different emotional expressions, and in which depressed
participants exhibit specific impairments. These impairments
are explained by assuming that depressed participants selec-
tively elaborate on sad items as they are removed from work-
ing memory, and that they have a perceptual bias towards sad
faces. In this way, by specifying a mechanism by which per-
formance impairments come about, the model helps to provide
a deeper understanding of the cognitive processes underlying
behaviour.
Keywords: depression; rumination; mind-wandering; work-
ing memory; computational cognitive modelling.
Introduction
Depression is an important mental health issue, but much
is still unknown about its cognitive mechanisms. A major
cognitive component of depression is thought to be rumina-
tion, which can be conceptualised as a maladaptive form of
mind-wandering (Marchetti, Koster, Klinger, & Alloy, 2016).
Mind-wandering, a process in which attention is directed
away from a task towards internal thoughts and memories,
can take up as much as 50% of our waking hours, and can
have both positive and negative effects on cognitive perfor-
mance (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013). What sets rumina-
tion apart from other forms of mind-wandering is that it is
characterised by a thematic narrowness, focusing primarily
on negative memories and thoughts related to one’s current
dysphoric state. Ruminators tend to repeatedly engage in cer-
tain narrow trains of thought from which it can be difficult to
escape (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna,
2016). While both depressed and non-depressed individu-
als have been observed to engage in off-task thinking dur-
ing laboratory tasks (e.g., Smallwood, Obonsawin, & Heim,
2003), participants with depression spend more time mind-
wandering than their non-depressed counterparts (Hoffmann,
Banzhaf, Kanske, Bermpohl, & Singer, 2016).
Rumination has been associated with several cognitive ef-
fects, including inhibitory and switching deficits. Individuals
who ruminate tend to have more difficulty inhibiting informa-
tion that is no longer relevant to their current situation, com-
pared to non-ruminators. A study by Whitmer and Banich
(2010), in which participants memorised a list of study items
and subsequently rehearsed only a subset of this list, found
that those with a tendency for rumination inhibited unre-
hearsed items from the original list less strongly than non-
ruminators. This inability to effectively inhibit outdated in-
formation also affects working memory. In a task-switching
paradigm, the occurrence of depressive rumination is associ-
ated with a weaker inhibition of previous task sets (Whitmer
& Banich, 2007). Depressed individuals find it particu-
larly difficult to inhibit obsolete information when it has a
negative valence (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008), whereas non-
depressed individuals have similar difficulty inhibiting posi-
tive stimuli (Deveney & Deldin, 2006), suggesting a mood-
congruency effect.
Aside from the inhibitory deficits associated with rumina-
tion, depression can also influence visual perception and at-
tention. Whereas healthy humans commonly exhibit a per-
ceptual bias towards positive stimuli, perception in those with
depression tends to be coloured by a negativity bias. When
Gollan, Pane, McCloskey, and Coccaro (2008) asked partici-
pants to judge the emotion of a neutral face in a forced-choice
task, non-depressed participants saw its emotion as happy
more often than sad, while depressed participants were more
inclined to judge the same face as sad. Visual attention is also
not immune to bias: depressed individuals tend to demon-
strate selective attention towards sad faces and/or away from
happy faces (Bourke, Douglas, & Porter, 2010; Suslow, Jung-
hanns, & Arolt, 2001). Indeed, depression may be linked to
a general negativity bias, which also reveals itself in, e.g.,
memory recall (Dalgleish & Watts, 1990).
Gaining a better understanding of how depression influ-
ences and interacts with cognition could potentially aid the
development of better diagnostic tools and more effective
treatments. Schemes that are currently used to diagnose psy-
chiatric disorders tend to be overly simplistic in their cate-
gorisation, and do not translate well to the clinical level (van
Os et al., 1999). Existing cognitive theories of depression,
generally formulated as verbal accounts, can be difficult to
generalise or integrate with other theories. In recent years, the
field of computational psychiatry has demonstrated the bene-
fits of striving towards more rigorous accounts of the role of
cognition in mental illness (Adams, Huys, & Roiser, 2016).
We have been developing such a computational model in
the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson, 2007), which
is well-suited to translating verbal theories into quantitative
predictions. Increasing the prominence of negative items
in the model’s declarative memory transforms its regular
mind-wandering behaviour into more persistent, negatively-
coloured depressive rumination (van Vugt, van der Velde, &
ESM-MERGE Investigators, 2018). When applied to a sus-
tained attention task, the model predicts lower response accu-
racy as a result of this change.
Here, we extend this model to a more complex task, the
emotional n-back task (Levens & Gotlib, 2010). Modelling
this task requires the addition of some mechanisms to our ex-
isting model. The task, a modified version of the n-back,
uses images of happy, neutral, and sad faces as its stim-
uli. It involves complex working memory operations, as par-
ticipants are required to maintain an up-to-date mental list
of recently seen items in their memory in order to respond
correctly (Lovett, Daily, & Reder, 2000; Juvina & Taatgen,
2007). Because of its use of emotional face stimuli and its
reliance on working memory, this task is expected to elicit
many of the cognitive effects of depression.
Levens and Gotlib (2010) had depressed and non-
depressed participants perform the emotional n-back task,
and found that, while depressed participants responded more
slowly and slightly less frequently across conditions, they
were as accurate as healthy controls at identifying whether a
face had the same expression as one shown two trials earlier.
Response times did reveal differences in working memory up-
dating: depressed participants responded relatively quickly in
trials with a sad stimulus, compared to happy or neutral tri-
als, indicating easier integration of a sad face into their mental
list. Furthermore, depressed participants were relatively slow
when breaking a former set of matching faces with sad ex-
pressions, suggesting a tendency to linger on negative items
as they were pushed off the mental list, possibly because these
items activated related concepts and memories more easily.
For instance, a sad face might trigger ruminative thoughts in
a participant about a negative experience or their current dys-
phoria. Such an elaboration on mood-congruent items could
also account for the observation that non-depressed control
participants responded relatively slowly in trials that involved
breaking a set of happy faces, as these items might trig-
ger positive elaboration in healthy participants. Surprisingly,
there was no evidence of a perceptual bias: in a 0-back control
condition, in which participants compared each stimulus to a
target expression given earlier, depressed and non-depressed
participants performed identically.
We present a computational cognitive model that can ex-
plain the observed differences in performance between de-
pressed participants and healthy controls, on the basis of sim-
ple assumptions about mental elaboration on mood-congruent
items as they are removed from working memory, which can
account for the behavioural differences between participants
with and without depression. Our model also suggests that
the existence of a perceptual bias is necessary for capturing
depressed participants’ faster responses to sad stimuli in the
2-back task.
Model
Following our previous model of rumination, performance on
the emotional n-back task is modelled as a competition for
cognitive resources between task-directed thought and off-
task thought (i.e., mind-wandering or rumination).
The model is implemented in the PRIMs cognitive archi-
tecture (Taatgen, 2013), an extension of the ACT-R archi-
tecture (Anderson, 2007). Like ACT-R, PRIMs provides a
framework for modelling an entire task, from perceptual in-
put to motor output, and everything in between. The archi-
tecture consists of a number of modules (declarative mem-
ory, working memory, vision, goal state, motor action) that
exchange information through buffers. A PRIMs model has
one or more goals, each of which has a unique set of op-
erators associated with it. PRIMs operators are comparable
to production rules in ACT-R: if-then rules requiring certain
conditions to be met before a sequence of information pro-
cessing steps is performed. For example, a goal might be to
memorise a letter shown on screen. An operator associated
with this goal may first check that there is a letter, read the
letter, and then encode it in a new memory chunk in working
memory.
Unlike ACT-R, the PRIMs architecture makes no theo-
retical distinction between procedural knowledge (operators
or productions) and declarative knowledge (facts): both are
treated as regular chunks stored in declarative memory. This
means that, like declarative facts, each operator has an acti-
vation value (representing its memory trace strength, which
is boosted by retrievals and decays over time), and is sub-
ject to spreading activation. Goals spread activation to their
operators, making operators belonging to more active goals
more likely to be selected for execution. Operators can also
spread activation to each other, thereby increasing the like-
lihood that operator execution follows a certain favoured se-
quence. Chunks in other buffers, such as the imaginal buffer
or the retrieval buffer, can furthermore influence operator se-
lection through spreading activation. Because of these dy-
namics, a PRIMs model can freely alternate operators from
different goals. Our emotional n-back model switches flexi-
bly between operators that fall under the umbrella of the task
goal, and operators that enact the mind-wandering goal.
The model also builds on previous ACT-R models of the 2-
back task. Lovett et al. (2000) and Juvina and Taatgen (2007)
implemented multiple 2-back strategies. Here, we implement
their high-effort strategy, since participants were explicitly in-
structed to use this method. This means that the model holds a
list of the most recently seen stimuli in its declarative memory
that is updated every trial. Each item on this list is a chunk,
encoding the facial expression of the stimulus (happy, neu-
tral, or sad) as well as its position in the list (0-back, 1-back,
or 2-back). At the start of a trial, the model retrieves each item
on the list in turn, increments its list position, and pushes the
modified item back to declarative memory. In the case of the
old 2-back chunk, its index is changed to old, reflecting the
fact that it is no longer part of the list. The new stimulus that
is currently on screen is then added to the front of the list. To
decide its response, the model retrieves the 2-back item from
memory and compares it to the current stimulus.
The recognition of facial expressions is modelled as a
memory retrieval: the model sees a string representing a
face, which it uses as a cue to retrieve the corresponding ex-
pression from its declarative memory. This mechanism al-
lows us to model differences in recognition speed by varying
the activation of face chunks of different emotional valence.
Levens and Gotlib (2010) found that both depressed and non-
depressed participants responded more quickly to happy faces
than to sad or neutral faces, so chunks representing happy
faces are given a higher activation, making them faster to
retrieve. Since humans are not perfect at recognising facial
expressions, we use partial matching to allow the occasional
retrieval of an incorrect facial expression. Participants in both
groups were more accurate in their responses to happy faces
than to sad or neutral faces, with neutral faces being the most
difficult to categorise (Levens & Gotlib, 2010). This effect is
captured in the model by varying the mismatch penalty that is
applied to a non-matching face on the basis of its expression.
The competing mind-wandering goal is implemented as
a process of memory retrieval, following earlier models of
mind-wandering (van Vugt, Taatgen, Sackur, & Bastian,
2015; van Vugt et al., 2018). At any point in the task, op-
erators from this goal can initiate the retrieval of a sequence
of random items from declarative memory. Once a memory is
retrieved, it is placed in the model’s working memory to bring
it to the forefront of attention, and a new memory is retrieved.
This process continues until a task operator is selected.
In addition to the 2-back condition, we also model the 0-
back condition, which Levens and Gotlib (2010) used to show
that depressed participants did not have a different perceptual
bias than non-depressed controls. The 0-back model works
the same as the 2-back model when it comes to perceiving
and classifying stimuli, but differs in how it determines the
correct response. In the 0-back condition, each stimulus has
to be compared to a target expression, which eliminates the
need for maintaining a history of recent stimuli in memory.
Instead, once the model has determined the facial expression
of a stimulus, it directly compares the expression to the target
stored in its goal buffer, and responds accordingly.
To capture the differences between depressed and non-
depressed participants, we manipulated several aspects of the
model. Firstly, since depression is associated with more per-
vasive mind-wandering, the activation of mind-wandering op-
erators was increased in the depressed version of the model,
making them more likely to be selected. In addition, we recre-
ated the general psychomotor slowing found in those with
depression (Schrijvers, Hulstijn, & Sabbe, 2008) by increas-
ing the time needed to execute a keypress in the depressed
model. These two manipulations were expected to lower the
depressed model’s response rate on the n-back, while increas-
ing its average response time.
Depression is linked to difficulties inhibiting negative emo-
tional information that is no longer relevant, so the model in-
cludes a mechanism by which it can elaborate on sad faces
as they are discarded. Whenever a sad face is pushed off the
model’s mental list of recent stimuli, the task process can be
briefly interrupted by an elaboration operator from the mind-
wandering goal. Although it is simply implemented as a de-
lay in the current model, this operator represents the activa-
tion of related concepts and memories that are triggered by
the sad face. The time penalty that is incurred by lingering on
old information and subsequently having to refocus on up-
dating the mental list will slow down the model’s response in
the affected trials. Since non-depressed individuals have been
found to exhibit a difficulty letting go of positive emotional
information, a similar mechanism is implemented in the non-
depressed version of the model. Rather than elaborating on
negative items, however, the non-depressed model has an op-
erator that can elaborate on happy faces as they are removed
from the mental list.
Finally, the depressed version of the 2-back model includes
a negative perceptual bias: sad face chunks are given a higher
activation than in the non-depressed version of the model,
which makes them faster to retrieve. Since Levens and Gotlib
(2010) did not find evidence of such a bias in the 0-back con-
dition, it is left out of the 0-back model.
Parameters that distinguish the depressed model from the
control model (activation of mind-wandering operators, key-
press duration, and activation of face chunks) were initially
set to reasonable values and were subsequently adjusted to
better fit the behavioural results. The full code for de-




The depressed and control version of the 0-back model were
each run 50 times, simulating 50 participants per group (sim-
ilar to the 29 participants per group in the empirical data).
Both models went through 9 full training runs of 3 blocks
with 43 trials each to learn the task, before they performed a
final run. Only the final run of each model was analysed.
2-back
Both versions of the 2-back model were run 50 times, simu-
lating 50 depressed participants and 50 control participants.
The models received a similar amount of training as before (3
full runs containing 6 blocks of 55 trials), before performing
a final run. Once again, only this last run was analysed.
Analysis
Performance of the depressed and control versions of the
emotional n-back model was compared to that of the de-
pressed and healthy participants in Levens and Gotlib (2010).
Following Levens and Gotlib, we removed trials with re-
sponse times outside 2.5 SD of a model participant’s mean
response time. Only correct trials were used for calculating
mean response time. Trials in which the model did not re-
spond within 2 seconds after stimulus onset were considered
non-response trials. These trials were excluded when calcu-












































Figure 1: 0-back model performance compared to that of real
participants. The model replicates the slightly lower response
rate of depressed participants relative to controls (a), as well
as the lack of a difference in accuracy between groups (b). As
in humans, the depressed version of the model has longer re-
sponse times (c). Error bars indicate 1 SD from the mean (SD
of the human response rate and accuracy was unavailable).
relative response speed between groups, response times were
normalised using a z-transformation (for every participant,
each condition mean RT was subtracted from their overall
mean RT and divided by the SD of the condition RT).
Results
0-back
Figure 1 summarises the 0-back model’s behavioural fit to
the human data1. It shows that, by increasing the model’s
tendency to engage in mind-wandering and by slowing down
its motor response, we can reproduce the lower response rate
and higher response times of depressed participants, relative
to their non-depressed counterparts (although the model’s re-
sponse times are less variable than those of human partici-
pants). As in humans, depression does not affect response
accuracy; the depressed and non-depressed versions of the
model have equal accuracy (albeit slightly higher than the
accuracy of human participants). Table 1 confirms that the
model fits the data satisfactorily.
2-back
Figure 2 shows the fit of the 2-back model to the human data.
As before, the higher activation of mind-wandering opera-
tors in the depressed version, together with a longer keypress
time, causes it to correctly predict a lower response rate and
higher response times relative to the control model. However,
1The output data of the model, as well as additional
analyses of the results, including a more detailed break-













































Figure 2: 2-back model performance compared to that of real
participants. The model replicates the lower response rate of
depressed participants relative to controls (a), but does not
capture the similar response accuracy of both groups (b). As
in humans, the depressed version of the model has longer re-
sponse times (c). Error bars indicate 1 SD from the mean (SD
of the human response rate and accuracy was unavailable).
while participants in both groups responded equally accu-
rately, the control model is more accurate than the depressed
model. Both models’ accuracy is slightly too high, but other-
wise they capture the differences between groups (Table 1).
Z-transformed response times in two relevant 2-back con-
ditions are shown in Figure 3. As Figure 3a shows, the model
reproduces the relatively slow responses that occur in trials
which require a mood-congruent face to be removed from the
mental list. By elaborating on sad faces as they are being
discarded, the depressed version of the model takes relatively
long to respond in trials in which a previous set of sad faces
is broken. In contrast, the control model is slower than usual
in trials that require the breaking of an old set of happy faces,
as it spends some time elaborating on the happy face being
discarded. When breaking a neutral set, neither model elabo-
rates on the discarded face. As a result, both are equally fast
(accounting for differences in baseline speed), matching the
Table 1: Model fit to data. RMSE = root-mean-square error.
Task Measure RMSE
0-back Response rate .01
Accuracy .07
Response time (s) .04
2-back Response rate .04
Accuracy .09
Response time (s) .01
Z-transformed RT .46
break set no set























Figure 3: Z-transformed response times of the model com-
pared to those of human participants on two conditions of the
2-back task. (a) When breaking a mental set (i.e., discard-
ing one of the elements that previously made up a set from
the mental list), the model reproduces the mood-congruent
slowing effect seen in humans: the control model responds
relatively slowly when breaking a happy set, while the de-
pressed model is slow when breaking a sad set. Like hu-
mans, both models are equally fast when breaking a neutral
set. (b) In non-match trials without a set to break, the de-
pressed model responds more quickly to a sad stimulus than
the control model, matching the pattern found in humans. Er-
ror bars indicate 1 SD from the mean.
pattern found in human participants.
Figure 3b further shows that, by manipulating the speed
at which the model recognises a particular facial expression,
we can recreate the human response time pattern observed
in trials without a previous set to break or a current match.
In particular, the higher activation of sad face chunks in the
depressed model allows it to respond more quickly in trials
with a sad stimulus, compared both to its own response times
in happy or neutral trials and to the control model’s responses
in sad trials.
Discussion
In this paper we have presented a model of the cognitive ef-
fects of depression on performance in an emotional working
memory task. Through the model, we have identified several
key factors that differ between depressed and non-depressed
participants. Depressed patients have a stronger tendency for
mind-wandering, at the cost of attending to the task, which
explains a lower response rate. Additionally, a slower motor
response accounts for a higher average response time. Since
individuals with depression were previously found to have
difficulty inhibiting negatively-valenced information once it
was no longer relevant, we implemented a mechanism for
elaborating on negative items as they were discarded. With
this mechanism, the model reproduces the observed response
time pattern in the human data. The same mechanism, but
focused on positive instead of negative items, furthermore
captures the opposite pattern that was present in the non-
depressed control group.
A potential criticism of our model is that it fails to pro-
vide a unified explanation for depressed participants’ lack of
a perceptual bias in the 0-back on one hand, and their faster
responses to sad stimuli in the 2-back on the other. Depressed
0-back performance is captured without a perceptual bias rel-
ative to the control model. Yet, the depressed 2-back model
requires faster perception of sad faces to reproduce depressed
participants’ relatively fast responses to sad faces.
There are two responses to this. Firstly, it is possible that
the absence of perceptual bias in the 0-back task was a chance
finding—indeed, it is inconsistent with earlier studies associ-
ating depression with a negative perceptual bias, and a study
by the same authors in which participants who had recovered
from depression performed the same task did find a sadness
bias in the 0-back (Levens & Gotlib, 2015). If so, we could
use the same response bias in the 0-back and 2-back models.
Alternatively, the inconsistency is due to an architectural
limitation. It can be argued that the lower response times to
sad stimuli in the 2-back task are not the result of faster per-
ception, but rather of faster integration into working memory.
Currently, PRIMs (and ACT-R) assumes that creating a new
chunk in working memory takes a fixed length of time, irre-
spective of its contents. If it is indeed the case that depressed
individuals integrate sad faces more quickly into working
memory than neutral or happy faces, the architecture would
have to be extended to support a variable working memory
integration time that is dependent on an item’s content.
An additional limitation of the model is that it assumes
there to be little interaction between perceptual bias, working
memory bias, and the mind-wandering process. Instead, these
components are modelled as separate mechanisms. In an ear-
lier version of the model we unsuccessfully used spreading
activation in an attempt to influence task performance through
the occurrence of mind-wandering. In that model, mind-
wandering memories had an emotional valence (happy, neu-
tral, or sad) and could spread activation to face chunks with
their respective emotion, such that negatively-themed mind-
wandering would make recognition of sad faces faster, and
the processing of sad faces would more easily trigger mind-
wandering. This approach failed because spreading activation
is too fleeting, disappearing as soon as its source leaves its
buffer. To make it work would require having a longer-lasting
effect of spreading activation. Alternatively, affect-related
spreading activation should come from an external source
(such as physiology, see, e.g., ACT-R Φ (Dancy, 2013),
which would also allow one to model some of the biologi-
cal factors underlying depression). A further option would be
to model the tendency to elaborate on mood-congruent infor-
mation as a learned association. Future work should examine
whether these mechanisms could achieve a similar fit to the
data while requiring fewer parameters.
In summary, we have shown how computational cognitive
modelling can help us uncover the cognitive mechanisms that
shape behaviour in depression and other psychiatric disor-
ders. With a stronger propensity for mind-wandering, slower
motor actions, a negative perceptual bias, and selective elab-
oration on mood-congruent items in working memory, our
model reproduces specific behavioural deficits in working
memory observed in humans. Through the implementation
of existing theory, and by comparing the resulting predictions
against human behaviour, we can deepen our understanding
of the depressed mind.
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